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Despite its importance in global illegal migration, there is little, and mostly theoretical 
research on human smuggling. We suggest an analytical framework to understand the micro 
structure of the human smuggling market. Migrants interact with smuggling and financing 
intermediaries; these may or may not be integrated with each other, and with the migrants’ 
employers. Policies of receiving countries (border controls, employer sanctions, deportation 
policies, sales of visa) affect the interactions in the smuggling market, and, hence, migration 
flows. We review the theoretical work, point to the scarce empirical evidence, and identify 
challenges for future theoretical, empirical work and policy advice. 
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1.  Introduction 
While of increasing empirical importance, the phenomenon of human smuggling in 
illegal migration has only recently received notable attention in academics. A search in 
scholar.google.com reveals that among the more than 20,000 hits for “human 
smuggling” almost all stem from the late nineties or later. Economics has been quiet 
about smuggling and illegal migration until recently, while scholars in law, 
criminology, sociology, political science, and demography have discovered the topic 
somewhat earlier (e.g, Salt, 2000, Salt and Stein, 1997).  
Illegal migration, in contrast, has been an important topic in economics for quite 
a while, at least since Ethier’s (1986) analysis of the host country’s problem and 
Djajic’s (1987) two-country model of illegal migration. These models are very 
informative on a macro-level and they point to important institutional determinants of 
illegal migration such as the structure of the host country’s labor market. However, they 
do not look at the micro structure of the market for migration, which is increasingly 
determined by the relationship between intermediaries that finance and organize illegal 
migration, and their “customers”, the potential migrants. As human smuggling is a 
multi-billion global business, it lends itself readily to micro-economic analysis.
i  We 
will hence use the neutral language of microeconomics, although we are quite aware 
that illegal migration and human smuggling is a dangerous, violent and often 
humiliating business.  
We discuss the small but growing micro-economic literature on the human 
smuggling business, and will show that the predictions about the effects of policies such 
as border controls, employer sanctions, deportation policies and amnesties depend quite 




between migrants and intermediaries is considered. In most of this paper, we will 
maintain a positive perspective. The normative aspects will be discussed later, albeit in 
a non-exhaustive way. 
A first important step to integrating intermediaries in the economic analysis of 
illegal migration is to clearly identify the reason for their existence. First, international 
migration is a costly activity, not only in terms of the risk for health and life involved, 
but also in terms of the financial means needed. During the first wave of modern 
international migration during the 17
th century, an estimated 60% of the migrants from 
the British Isles to the North American colonies overcame financing constraints by 
selling themselves into indentured servitude for a limited period of time. A first striking 
difference to modern human smuggling is that in the times of indentured servitude, 
transportation costs were very high compared to wages. Nowadays, transportation per se 
is cheap but the legal barriers to migrations are high. This drives migration costs up and 
creates the business for intermediaries. The second difference is that, at the time, 
indentured servitude was legal; people had the right to “sell” themselves and the 
contracts between the “owner” and the migrant were enforced. Contemporaneous 
societies, however, are quite concerned about the moral and economic repercussions of 
such intermediaries, and servitude contracts are outlawed.  
The second important reason for the existence of intermediaries in illicit 
migration are economies of scales in technology and access to networks. Intermediaries 
have the know-how to make migration happen, in terms of getting migrants from the 
home to the host country, potentially avoiding border controls and internal enforcement 
activities. They provide housing, food and work, which although oftentimes of low 




Intermediaries have information that migrants may not have, they have access to 
employer and social networks, and can hide the migrants from law enforcement 
agencies seeking to deport the migrants. Economies of scale in transportation and in the 
provision of work provide further rationales for the existence of intermediaries. 
Because of its illegal character, the relationship between intermediaries and 
migrants is fraught with problems of potential abuse. The contracts between migrants, 
smugglers and employers are not enforceable, therefore each party in these relationships 
is subject to the risk of opportunistic behavior of counterparties. To overcome the 
contractual imperfections, smugglers oftentimes vertically integrated with employers of 
migrants. However, as they cannot vertically integrate with the migrant, the moral 
hazard problems – both on the side of the intermediary and on the migrant’s side – 
remain important features of the relationship. Intermediaries may not only have 
substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis the migrants, they may also behave in 
opportunistic ways ex post, for instance, by charging the migrants higher prices than 
agreed upon, or paying lower wages. They may also be prone to ex ante opportunistic 
behavior. The most extreme form of such ex ante opportunistic behavior is coercion, 
and the presence or absence of coercion can be used to define the limits between 
smuggling and trafficking. While the use of smuggling involves that migrant and 
intermediary agree to enter a contractual relationship, trafficking means that the migrant 
is coerced into the relationship.  
This becomes evident when one compares the definitions of smuggling, and 
trafficking provided by the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UN 
TOC, 2004) Trafficking is here defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, 




coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” 
Smuggling is “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the 
person is not a national or a permanent resident”(Article 3).  
In most of this paper, we look at smuggling, that is, we assume that migrants 
enter the relationship with intermediaries without being coerced, at least ex ante.
ii We 
are aware that this distinction is a fuzzy one, and discuss this problem in the last section. 
We here review the literature we are aware of, without claiming to be exhaustive, 
neither in terms of theory, nor in terms of empirical literature we may have overlooked. 
  In what follows we suggests frameworks to think about many of the above 
issues, in terms of the reasons of existence, the potential for abuse, and the 
consequences of the micro structure of illegal migration on the effect of polices. We 
review the small number of available models to better understand the relationship 
between intermediaries and potential migrants. We also highlight how different 
strategies of the receiving countries, such as border enforcement, internal enforcement 
and deportation policies are likely to affect the relationship, the division of rents and the 
outcomes in terms of quantities and types of equilibrium migration. We conclude by 
discussing a list of challenges in terms of theory, empirical work, and policy advice.  
 
2.  Theoretical frameworks for human smuggling 
The model of Friebel and Guriev (2006) is the first to consider the micro structure of 




account that migration involves costs that most migrants cannot finance themselves, and 
that the policies of host governments – by affecting the relationship between migrants 
and intermediaries – change migration outcomes both in terms of quantities and skill 
composition. The effects of policies targeted against illegal migration in a model with a 
smuggling intermediary are indeed quite different from the ones of traditional models 
that do not consider the micro structure of the market for illegal migration. 
In Friebel and Guriev’s model, migrants need to enter a host country in which 
expected wages are higher than in the home country. Intermediaries are integrated 
structures that provide the smuggling services, as well as financing and jobs.  A 
(potentially small) proportion of high-skilled, wealthy migrants hire the intermediary to 
provide the smuggling services and pay them cash. Low-skilled potential migrants are 
wealth- constrained.
iii They can enter a contract with the intermediary in which the 
intermediary provides the smuggling services and finances the illegal migration. The 
migrant in turn promises to pay back his debt through the labor income after successful 
migration, in the host country. 
This model is inspired by the incomplete contracting literature in corporate 
finance (see Tirole, 2006), inasmuch as it assumes that, in a way similar to a wealth-
constrained entrepreneur vis-à-vis his investors, a potential migrant cannot commit 
himself to paying back the debt to the intermediary, rather than defaulting strategically. 
Consequently, the main source of ex post opportunistic behavior or moral hazard is on 
the side of the migrant. The model thus reflects the reality of modern illegal migration 
as the contract between the intermediary and the migrant cannot be enforced in the legal 
sector of the host country (in contrast to the indentured servitude contracts of the 17
th 




the intermediary can enforce the contract through the threat of violence, by excluding 
the migrant from a network, or by keeping the migrant in a safe house. When the 
migrant exits the relationship by moving to the legal sector, he defaults on the 
repayment of the debt to the intermediary. Upon doing so, however, he takes the risk of 
being deported to the home country, which occurs with probability D. The larger D, i.e., 
the stricter a country’s deportation and legalization policies, the smaller a migrant’s 
default probability.  
Hence, a decrease in D makes it less likely for the intermediary to recover his 
investment, involving that less low-skilled, wealth-constrained migrants can be 
smuggled into the host country. By the same token, a decrease in D also means that 
migrants who are not wealth-constrained find it more interesting to migrate, because 
they take lower risks of being sent home when trying to transit to the legal sector. The 
total quantitative effect on migration is ambiguous, but the skill composition of 
migrants increases when D decreases.  
Increases in the strictness of border controls have more straightforward 
consequences: they reduce the net present value of all migrants, and thus decrease 
migration of both types of workers. The model thus generates quite different testable 
predictions about the effects of border controls versus deportation policies. While in 
macro models without wealth-constraints and smuggling intermediaries, border controls 
and deportation policies have quite similar effects: both policies reduce the net present 
value of migration. In the model of Friebel and Guriev, the prediction is that border 
controls decrease the size of migration flows, while deportation policies change the skill 
composition. These predictions are testable, in a cross-country perspective, because 




with respect to deportation policies, and longitudinally, because spending on 
enforcement measures changes when a government with a different ideology comes into 
office. 
The model also provides an economic rationale for a policy against migration 
that is tough with respect to border controls, but soft on deportation polices. Not 
sending migrants home who default on the debt contracts by trying to move out from 
the illegal sector is not only appealing from a moral point of view, but would also 
reduce the inflow of migrants. 
This setup also highlights an additional positive effect of amnesties and 
legalization of illegal migrants (besides the one highlighted in Chau, 2001, in which 
large amnesties can be used as a commitment device to enhance the credibility of 
employer sanctions). In Chau’s model there are however no intermediaries. In Friebel 
and Guriev’s model, expected amnesties increase the risk of migrant’s default on the 
debt to intermediary. Therefore, the smugglers are less interested ex ante to enter into 
the relationship with wealth-constrained migrants; this, in turn, may reduce the overall 
migration flow. 
The Friebel and Guriev model is highly stylized and does not take into account 
important elements of the market for illegal migration. In particular, in the model, the 
risk of ex post opportunistic behavior is only present on the side of the migrant. In 
Tamura (2010), migrants have no financial constraints. Rather, the migrant can commit 
himself to pay the smuggler upon successfully arriving in the host country. The source 
of moral hazard is thus the smuggler, and not the migrant. Some smugglers may be able 
to force the migrants to work without pay, once the migrant has entered a relationship 




in the transaction just as Friebel and Guriev (2006): migrants choose whether or not 
engage with a intermediary under full awareness that they may have to work without 
pay if they contract with “exploitative” smugglers. Thus, exploitation is quite similar to 
“indentured servitude” in Friebel and Guriev, but the source of such bonded labor is not 
contractual consent but ex post opportunistic behavior. Ex ante coercion, however, is 
not considered. 
The policy setup is very rich. The government may raise the intensity of 
enforcement as measured by the probability of apprehension at the border, or within the 
host country. It may also vary the penalty for border apprehension and for the illegal 
employment (in both cases the penalty is imposed both on the migrant and on the 
smuggler). Smugglers vary in terms of their capacity to exploit and choose whether to 
exploit the migrants depending on the government policies. The migrants observe the 
smugglers’ capacity to exploit and therefore infer their risk to be exploited. 
In this setting – like in Friebel and Guriev – migration policies affect not only 
the total flow of migration but also its composition and characteristics. In particular, 
through tightening the policies along any of the six dimensions (probabilities of 
detention within the country and at the border; fines in case of detention at the border 
and within, for migrant and smuggler, respectively), the government reduces the level of 
exploitation as certain exploitative smugglers exit the market or become non-
exploitative. This result is based on the important assumption that the government 
imposes penalties for exploitative employment but not for a non-exploitative 
employment of illegal immigrants. Hence, the effect of stricter immigration policy is 
different for exploitative and non-exploitative smugglers. Such an assumption seems 




employers of illegal immigrants. The paper also provides scope for empirical testing, 
however, mainly along the lines of the amount of exploitation. 
Tamura’s theory highlights the need for analyzing the business of intermediaries 
and smugglers, and exploitative and non-exploitative employers of illegal immigrants 
separately. Different policies affect different links in the “illegal immigration value 
chain.” For example, border apprehensions affect smugglers, while employer sanctions 
affect employers. Given that contracting between smugglers and employers (as well as 
migrants) takes place outside the legal system, these markets are highly imperfect and 
therefore it is difficult for the parties to pass the burden of potential penalties and 
sanctions up and down the “value chain”. 
The results are somewhat different once the symmetric information assumption 
is dropped. Like in the “lemons market” of Akerlof (1970), Tamura’s (2011) follow-up 
model shows that if the capacity to exploit is the smuggler’s private information, in 
equilibrium there is no way for “non-exploitative” smugglers to signal their type. 
Therefore, such smugglers are driven out of the market and only “exploitative” 
smugglers prevail. Here the policy implications become more nuanced. Stricter 
enforcement reduces exploitation but increases the overall flow of illegal immigrants (as 
the non-exploitive smugglers re-enter the market). Hence, Tamura (2011) allows test 
along the dimensions of migration flows and thus complements Friebel and Guriev. 
Auriol and Mesnard (2012) dig deeper into the industrial organization of the 
market for human smuggling. They abstract from financing constraints; the 
intermediary is only providing the smuggling services required for migration. The 
smuggling market is assumed to be concentrated, because of the legal restrictions to 




or to networks in the host country). The assumption about market concentration is not 
only reasonable, it also gives rise to interesting, novel effects. In particular, if the 
smuggler has some market power, policies that raise the costs of the smuggling tend to 
increase the exploitation of migrants through the price that migrants have to pay. A 
government can try to eliminate the smuggling market by providing visas to sale to 
migrants. While this undermines the market power of the smuggling network, it 
increases the flow of migrants and deteriorates the skill composition. The latter effect 
stems from the fact that higher-skilled migrant have higher willingness to pay. Hence, a 
decrease in prices raises the flows and attracts less skilled migrants. The prediction 
concerning skill composition is similar to the one in Friebel and Guriev, in which higher 
deportation policies have the same effects. 
Auriol and Mesnard, however, have a richer policy space. Hence, in the presence 
of the policy tradeoff “exploitation of migrants versus migration control (in terms of 
quantities and qualities)” they can treat the question whether a combination of 
instruments can improve the situation. Auriol and Mesnard show that it is indeed 
possible to improve on both dimensions of the objective function by using the funds 
raised by the sales of visa for investment into border controls and employers sanctions, 
thus, raiding the profits of smuggling networks. Auriol and Mesnard also provide 
calibrations to show that the prices for visa sales needed to drive smugglers of Chinese 
migrants out of business would be up to 47,000 dollars. Auriol and Mesnard’s (2012) 
paper does not only go a step further to better understand the micro structure of the 
market for smuggling, it also raises an interesting debate about the welfare implications 




Djajic and Vinogradova (2011) provide another complementary analysis. They 
consider a situation of wealth-constrained migration; their interest, however, is not so 
much the strategic interaction between intermediaries and migrants, but endogenizing 
the saving decision of migrants. Migrants decide when to leave and whether or not to 
use a loan by the intermediary, maximizing the intertemporal utility stream of their 
lifetime. If a migrant saves for a longer period of time, he can migrate without entering 
a debt/labor contract, but if migration is desired to be earlier, bonded labor is the only 
option. 
A number of noteworthy results originate from the model. First, it is optimal for 
migrants to enter debt/labor contracts when migration costs are low and foreign wages 
are high. In the case of higher migration costs or lower foreign wages, it becomes 
preferable to save longer and finance migration by proper funds. Second, in terms of the 
policy prediction, tougher border controls reduce the incidence of debt/labor contracts, 
which is in contrast to Friebel and Guriev (2006) in which tougher border controls by 
increasing the costs of migration push more people into entering debt/labor contracts. 
Third, employer sanctions are likely to reduce the incidence of debt/labor contracts.  
Djajic and Vinogradova (2011) and their companion paper (Djajic and 
Vinogradova, 2011a) in which the duration of the servitude period during which 
migrants pay back their debt is endogenized, have interesting normative implications: 
when saving and the payback period are endogenized, bonded labor is not necessarily a 
destiny of wealth-constrained migrants, but may be a choice variable similar to the one 
of many of the migrants in the first wave of indentured servitude during the 17th 
century. This posits inticrate welfare issues that we discuss in the next section. 




3.  Challenges 
The theoretical literature has looked at integrated (Friebel and Guriev, 2006) and non-
integrated intermediaries (Tamura, 2010) who may or may not have market power 
(Auriol and Mesnard, 2012). Moral hazard may be present on the side of the migrant 
(Friebel and Guriev, 2006) or the intermediary (Tamura, 2010, 2011). Also, the 
migrant’s capacity to pay the smuggling services up-front can be endogenized (Djajic 
and Vinogradova, 2011 and 2011a). The literature thus captures a broad range of 
institutional settings and decision problems of the relevant parties. The theories also 
look at a broad range of policy instruments, spanning from border controls, to 
deportation and legalization policies, employer sanctions and the sales of visa.   
Many of the issues of human smuggling still remain open. We believe that the 
applicability of human smuggling theories for policy advice could be largely increased 
by tackling the following challenges: (i) building richer theories that take into account 
the upstream and downstream factors that are relevant for human smuggling, and make 
it possible to adapt theories to the specificities of the respective home and host 
countries; (ii) enhancing the theoretical and empirical knowledge about the parameters 
relevant for human smuggling activities; (iii) creating better distinctions between 
smuggling and trafficking and generating more reliable data; (iv) clarifying welfare 
issues and policy coordination. 
 
Richer theories on illegal migration and human smuggling 
Current theories do not model the labor market for illegal migrants in the host countries 
and, in this respect, fall back behind Ethier’s (1986) analysis that does incorporate 




Epstein and Heizler (2008) who investigate the effects of minimum wages in the host 
country on stocks of illegal migrants. They show that there is a positive relationship 
between the two. In the case of human smuggling, it is evident that the liquidity of the 
labor market, the productivity of the migrants and the distribution of bargaining power 
during and after the bondage period is crucial for wage determination. In turn, the wages 
earned during and after bondage determine the incentives of migrants to use 
intermediaries, the contract terms and the composition of migrants. Theories of the 
labor market for illegal immigrants, and of entrepreneurship among migrants are an 
important building block for a better understanding of illicit migration with the help of 
intermediaries. In particular, if membership in a social network is important for 
employment after bondage, the incentives to default on the intermediary are reduced. 
This may explain why long-haul migration from China has been maintained for quite a 
while: networks help enforcing contracts between migrants and intermediaries as the 
migrants seem to fear exclusion from the networks.  Ethnicity may, however, also 
increase the possibility to default on implicit agreements, when links are weak, the 
ethnic minority is in itself heterogeneous or too small to maintain an economic identity. 
Related topics are further developed in the chapter on migration, ethnicity and economic 
integration. 
Another theory gap consists in the household reactions to policies undertaken by 
home countries.  Particularly important are information campaigns, which so far have 
not been considered by the existing theories of human smuggling. This is somewhat 
logical, because these theories usually build on symmetric information between migrant 
and smuggler. A notable theoretical exception is Tamura (2011). Mahmood and 




and argue for information campaigns to reduce trafficking.  Furthermore, Dula et al 
(2006) investigate to what extent it is optimal to shift some of the burden of policies 
against illegal immigration to home countries. 
Understanding the nature of the labor market for illegal immigrants is also 
important for estimating properly the long-term costs of illegal status of the migrants. If 
the illicit jobs do not provide opportunities for accumulating human capital, the 
migrants would fall further behind their counterparts in the legal sector of the host, but 
possibly also in the home country; this issue is discussed by Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 
(2002). 
Both broader and deeper is the question how the demand for illegal migration 
and smuggling services is affected by economic development and the resulting change 
in wage distribution, risk aversion and expectations.  In particular, whether or not 
workers are willing to subject themselves to the immense hardship and risks associated 
with illicit migration will depend on the standard of living in the home country and on 
norms.  
 
Parameters relevant for the human smuggling market 
In the absence of large data bases allowing econometric tests of the theories and their 
implications, calibrations of the theories seem the right approach. Indeed, some of the 
theories have been complemented by calibrations to check for the internal consistency 
of the theory (as in the case of Friebel and Guriev, 2006) or to generate implications (as 
in the case of Auriol and Mesnard, 2012). Auriol and Mesnard gather a host of available 




smuggling. They also highlight the sensitivity of these prices to other policy variables, 
for instance, deportation policies.  
But even for the relatively limited requirements involved by calibrations, the 
data situation is far from satisfactory, the need for better data is evident for trafficking 
(Laczko, 2002) and smuggling alike. While information about short-haul migration and 
human smuggling, in particular, between Mexico and the U.S. is of quite high quality 
(e.g., Hanson et al, 2002, Gathmann, 2008), data from long-haul migration is much 
harder to come by. Exceptions include some sociological work about Chinese migrants 
that is based on some hundreds interviews and provides quite detailed information 
(Chin, 1999). Other interesting sources are the New Immigrant Survey (Jasso et al., 
2000),
iv the survey on irregular migration in Italy by Coniglio et al (2006). There are 
other sources that while far from perfect, could provide useful information for 
calibrations. Examples from reports of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations include UNDOC , Clandestino, case studies and reports by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and even media reports, when used 
with a grain of salt. 
These figures stem from quite different sources, and they are generated by quite 
different techniques. Thus it would be very useful to review them systematically in 
order to generate a matching of different pairs of home and host countries with the 
respective information about wealth constraints and financing sources of migrants, risk 
aversion (for a recent theoretical contribution, see Woodland and Yoshida, 2006), 
information available for migrants, prices for smuggling service, physical risks involved 
with travelling and during the (potential) periods of bonded labor, deportation and 




employers etc. Similarly, it would be useful to know more about the different 
employment characteristics in host countries of migrants coming from different 
countries.
v   
 
Distinctions between smuggling and trafficking  
Throughout the paper we have used a clear distinction between smuggling and 
trafficking. The terms have, however, been used interchangeably by some researchers 
and practitioners. A lack of consensus on the use of the terms complicates the analysis 
of these activities, (se Salt and Hogarth in Laczko and Thompson, 2000: 18-23). 
However, recent efforts to create legal instruments to fight against human smuggling 
and trafficking have helped in providing a much clearer distinction between these 
activities. The widespread definition of smuggling versus trafficking that is based on 
whether or not migrants are coerced into a relationship or not, is useful for building 
theoretical frameworks. However, Tamura’s (2010) analysis shows that the frontiers 
between the concepts are not that clear cut. Even when migrants are not coerced to enter 
the relationship, they may nonetheless be exploited as post. Moreover, they may be 
aware of this ex ante and may still enter the relationship. Mahmoud and Trebesch 
(2010) use as a definition of trafficking the presence of coercion ex ante or ex post and 
argue that “high emigration areas are often disadvantaged… so that migrants… may be 
more willing to take risks, and possibly even consent to hazardous working conditions 
abroad”, which, again, shows that the distinction between the concepts is quite fuzzy.  
The problem is far-reaching not only because of the lack of conceptual clarity, 
but also because the data used often cannot distinguish perfectly whether a person is 




who was smuggled or trafficked was seen as a victim. Only recently, we have got used 
to make the distinction necessary to investigate illicit migration with intermediaries. 
Policy makers and NGOs now increasingly see the difference, and it can be expected 
that more care will be given interviewing migrants to identify clearer smuggled from 
trafficked migrants.  
A second, potentially harder to correct problem lies in the incentives of the 
migrants interviewed. As most migrants would like to stay in a host country, they have 
no incentives to reveal that they entered the relationship willingly, in particular, as 
victim protection programs and leniency programs are designed for victims of 
trafficking, not for the clients of smuggler intermediaries. Sampling techniques should 
be developed that allow more detailed investigations about the precise circumstances of 
a migrant’s coming to a host country. In particular, retrospective questions, to legalized 
migrants who need not fear deportation any more, could help to find out more about 
whether or not migration decisions involved ex post and/or ex ante  coercion, while any 
migrant expecting to be deported if no coercion was involved would have strong 
incentives not to reveal the truth. Besides retrospective questions, researchers could ask 
migrants whether or not they had access to people who had migrated, or, even easier, to 
the internet. It seems doubtful that anyone who has access to internet would not have 
known about some of the risks involved in migration. Notice that we are not advocating 
a different treatment of smuggled or trafficked migrants, but argue that identifying 
different types of migrants is crucial for research, and policy advice. 
 There is no easy solution for the problem of distinguishing smuggled from 
trafficked migrants, but it has serious implications. While the technology of trafficking 




Illicit immigration has features that distinguish it from the traditional cost-benefits 
considerations that determine migration decisions without intermediaries, for instance in 
the Harris and Todaro (1970) framework. This entails kinship and friendship networks, 
and political dimensions, like the vulnerability to conflicts and internal displacements. 
Taking these dimensions into account introduce a new set of challenges to empirical 
work. It requires more care in designing questionnaires and in qualifying people into 
smuggled versus trafficked migrants, understanding their motives, expectations, 
strategies and constraints. 
 
Intricate welfare issues, and  policy coordination  
Most of the papers we have discussed are purely positive. They investigate how 
increases of decreases of policies such as border enforcement, employer sanctions, 
deportation polices or amnesties affect the optimizing behavior of the parties involved 
and thus the outcomes of migration. The absence of normative analyses may be owing 
to the fact that positing a welfare function of a government creates three types of 
problems.  
First, the objectives of “planners” may be manifold and, quite often, 
contradicting. For a broader view on the topic, see the chapter on the political economy 
of migration in this chapter. In respect to our topic of human smuggling, it seems that 
contradictions in objectives and policies are not always clear to policy makers. The 
analysis of Auriol and Mesnard (2012) for instance shows that the goal  of reducing 
migrant streams and eradicating the smuggling intermediaries contradict each other, 
which only comes to the forefront when the market for smuggling is modeled explicitly.  




quantity of illegal migrants that are far from evident. Political economy considerations 
may also come into play. Conservative voters tend to like a tough stance on illegal 
migrants, but entrepreneurs, often also constituents of conservative parties, tend to like 
the idea of cheap labor and labor market competition; further examples can be found in 
the chapter on attitudes towards immigrants. Hence, it cannot be excluded that 
governments may take contradictory policy measures, for instance tough border 
controls, but lax employer sanctions to please both types of constituents by the same 
time. 
   The second obstacle to the formulation of normative analyses stems from the 
fact that policy goals and measures are often formulated on different levels. This has 
horizontal aspects: different federal agencies in a given country may be unable or 
unwilling to coordinate. In the context of the EU, Mayer et al (2010) have investigated 
the problems of coordinating on a joint immigration policy. While the border states like 
Italy must bear much of the costs of border enforcement, they are usually not the final 
destination for many if he smuggled migrants, who may rather migrate further to the 
more attractive labor markets in say Germany or the U.K. Consequently, the core 
countries of the EU may not agree on the desirability of legalization campaign of the 
border countries, and the willingness to invest in border enforcements may be lower in 
the border countries than in the core. On the EU level, there are initiatives to take care 
of this conflict of interest, for instance, through FRONTEX. So far, the results of this 
type of coordination effort seem to be less than satisfactory. 
The third point that makes a welfare analysis quite intricate are the moral tradeoffs 
involved. Unless one takes the arguably quite extreme position that only the welfare of 




to protect its borders. Unless perfect enforcement of borders were available such that the 
phenomenon of illegal migration ceases to exist altogether, any policy involves 
tradeoffs with respect to smuggled and trafficked individuals. These are not only forced 
into humiliating conditions through the need of staying into the shadow, but many of 
them are deported, often into the quite dangerous condition in the homes country (see 
the chapter on refugee migration). It could seem morally more acceptable to deport back 
smuggled people who knew about the risks and took a deliberate decision, rather than 
trafficked people. But whether or not these can be discerned is a topic discussed above.  
This short discussion is meant to suggest that a consensus what is morally sound 
behavior with respect to illegal migrants is very much needed, but we are far from it. 
Thus, government policies against illegal migration may very much be of a short-term 
and partial nature, reacting to pressure by various interest groups, beliefs or the media. 
While this justifies the positive perspective on many papers, and in-depth political 
economy analyses, it makes policy advice difficult, beyond the challenges because of 
theories with limited scope, lacking knowledge about important parameters, and fuzzy 
definitions of the type of migrants considered. 
 
4.  Concluding remarks  
To date, the research on human smuggling consists mainly of a small number of 
theoretical papers. While there is some scope for improvement of the theories, the main 
challenges seem to lie in improving the empirical knowledge, in order to be able to 
adjust theories to the respectively relevant condition of home and host country pairs. A 
host of empirical information is available and awaits systematic use, but additional 




anthropology alike to generate information that can be used for calibrations of the 
existing and new theories. In order to have reliable information as a basis of policy 
advice, new sampling techniques should be developped and care should be given to 
distinguish smuggling from trafficking. While smuggling and trafficking may look quite 
similar at first sight, both the mechanisms and the welfare implications are quite 
different. We also argue that a broad discussion about welfare definitions is needed to 
develop a normative analysis of the problem. 
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i For an early attempt to sketch the economics of human smuggling and trafficking , see 
Schloenhardt (1999). 
ii In the paper by Tamura (2010), discussed below, coercion and exploitation occurs, but only ex 
post. 
iii Notice that the model assumes perfect correlation between skills and wealth, an assumption 
that could be relaxed. 
iv The New Immigrant Survey is a survey of new legal immigrants. But the data set also contains 
migrants retrospective answers about the mode of entry in the 1990s. 
v In the context of trafficking, Akee et al (2011) have matched the existing data on trafficked 
migrants between countries and have tested a gravity model.  